The Conflict between United States Securities Laws on Insider Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws by Levin, Ellen R.




The Conflict between United States Securities
Laws on Insider Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy
Laws
Ellen R. Levin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ellen R. Levin, The Conflict between United States Securities Laws on Insider Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L.
& Bus. 318 (1985-1986)
COMMENTS
The Conflict Between United States
Securities Laws on Insider Trading and
Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 319
II. INSIDER TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES .............. 320
III. Swiss BANK SECRECY LAWS ............................ 325
A. Origins of Bank Secrecy ............................ 325
1. Civil Law Personality Rights ..................... 325
2. Swiss Contract Law .............................. 326
3. Swiss Penal Code Provisions ...................... 328
4. The Banking Law of 1934 ....................... 328
B. Exceptions to Bank Secrecy ......................... 330
1. Public Law Limitations .......................... 330
2. Debtor and Bankruptcy Limitations .............. 331
3. A Customer's Waiver of the Right to Secrecy ...... 332
IV. TREATY ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS .............................................. 332
V. THE APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ....... 335
VI. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ............... 340
VII. THE Swiss BANKERS' ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT ........ 343
VIII. EXISTING LIMITATIONS ................................. 346
IX. CONCLUSION ........................................... 349
Swiss Bank Secrecy Law
7:318(1985)
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Swiss have grown defensive about the bad repu-
tation their banks have earned for hiding so-called "dirty" money.' A
common perception is that through the protection of strict Swiss banking
and commercial secrecy laws, Swiss numbered accounts hold the ill-got-
ten gains of organized crime, corrupt politicians, United States income
tax evaders, and inside traders on United States securities markets.2 Both
out of concern for preserving the integrity of what is regarded as Switzer-
land's most valuable asset-its banking sector 3-and in response to
mounting criticism from abroad, Switzerland has agreed to help the
United States in its fight against international crime. Switzerland's coop-
eration commitments are embodied in the Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters4 and a Memorandum of Understanding5 which, in
conjunction with a Swiss Bankers' Association Agreement,6 facilitate the
enforcement of United States securities laws against insider trading.
This paper focuses on United States-Swiss law enforcement coopera-
tion in the field of insider trading. Part I examines United States securi-
ties laws against insider trading and how they conflict with Swiss laws on
bank secrecy. Part II examines the origin and operation of Swiss bank
secrecy laws. Part III describes the United States-Swiss Treaty on Mu-
1 See Surya, Switzerland: An End to Strict Banking Secrecy Rules? 5 Co. LAw. 198 (1984). In
a national referendum held on May 20, 1984, the Swiss electorate rejected a Socialist Party proposal
to relax Switzerland's strict banking secrecy laws. Despite this outcome, a smaller percentage than
was anticipated actually voted against the initiative. Overall, however, the rejection coupled with
the signing of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, see infra notes 171-98 and
accompanying text, reflect public sensitivity to the banking sector's tarnishing image. See Surya,
Switzerland: Referendum on the Banking Secrecy Laws, 6 Co. LAW. 51 (1985).
2 Various Congressional hearings examine how Swiss bank accounts are used to conceal crimi-
nal activities, including those of organized crime, tax evasion, and securities violations. See generally
Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the United States: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See also Crime and Se-
crecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix (Comm. Print 1983).
3 See Surya, Switzerland: An End to Strict Banking Secrecy Rules? 5 Co. LAW. 198 (1985). The
success of Switzerland's 572 banks has been attributed to the combination of the following factors:
the stringent Swiss bank secrecy laws, the strength of the Swiss economy, the efficient financial
infrastructure, Swiss political stability, and Switzerland's attractive geographic location. Id. See
also Navickas, Swiss Banks and Insider Trading in the United States, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 159,
160 (1984); Note, Insider Trading Laws & Swiss Banks: Recent Hope for Reconciliation, 22 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 306 n.20 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Recent Hope].
4 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, United States-Switzerland,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter MAT].
5 Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzer-
land, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter MOU].
6 Agreement of the Swiss Bankers' Association on the Misuse of Inside Information, Aug. 31,
1982, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 7 (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter BA].
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tual Assistance in Criminal Matters ("MAT" or "the Treaty") and its
limitations. United States judicial efforts to circumvent Swiss secrecy
laws are reviewed in Part IV including a discussion of two cases which
have created tensions between the two countries. Part IV then notes the
overall failure of unilateral attempts to reach an acceptable solution and
the impetus such failure has provided for negotiating an amicable bilat-
eral solution. The Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is outlined
in Part V including an explanation of how it provides law enforcement
cooperation in cases of insider trading not covered by the Treaty. Part
VI lays out the formal procedures under the Swiss Bankers' Association
Private Agreement ("BA" or "the Agreement") which the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission") must follow to ob-
tain Swiss cooperation in insider trading investigations. Part VII identi-
fies the limitations inherent in the MOU and the Agreement. Finally,
Part VIII concludes that the optimal solution to the conflict between
United States insider trading and Swiss secrecy laws lies with Swiss legis-
lation which criminalizes insider trading activity, thereby making
mandatory assistance under the Treaty available in a wide range of in-
sider trading cases.
II. INSIDER TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES
The need for United States-Swiss cooperation in the field of insider
trading investigation and prosecution arises from the conflicting nature
of United States securities and Swiss bank secrecy laws. Section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 19347 ("the Act") and Rule lOb-5 8
make it unlawful to buy or sell securities in any fraudulent or misleading
way. In addition, Section 14(e) of the Act9 and Rule 14e-310 make it
unlawful to buy or sell securities on the basis of material non-public in-
formation. Those who possess such information are considered "insid-
7 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter the Exchange
Act].
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule lOb-5 is one of the most significant anti-fraud provisions
enacted under the federal securities laws. It states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985).
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ers" 11 and are required to either disclose any such non-public
information or refrain from trading."l The prohibition against insider
trading is intended to preserve the integrity of the securities markets and
prevent insiders from realizing unfair profits.13 It is widely believed that
the informational advantage of insiders is one which other investors can-
not overcome, regardless of their diligence.14 Willful violations of the
Act are deemed criminal under section 32 of the Act and carry the poten-
tial penalty of a $10,000 fine or five years in prison, or both.
15
The SEC's Enforcement Division continually monitors securities ac-
tivity through computers programmed with information on prices and
usual trading volumes of securities. The computers identify sales and
purchases of securities which exceed the programmed amounts in price
or volume. A large purchase or sale followed by a public announcement
that causes the price of the security to increase dramatically may give rise
to suspicion that someone may have traded on the basis of material non-
public information.16 Suspicious transactions will generally trigger a pre-
liminary SEC investigation.17 The SEC begins its investigation by requir-
ing a broker/dealer who participated in a questionable transaction to
complete a standardized form. On that form the broker/dealer lists all
the transactions in which the broker/dealer or its customers have en-
gaged during the relevant period, identifies the number of the account
11 Neither § 10(b) nor § 14(e) specifically define who is an "insider" so as to be precluded from
dealing in corporate stock. Rule 14e-3 states that persons who trade on the basis of material non-
public information commit a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act in violation of § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act. Nonetheless, Rule 14e-3 does not define "insider" per se. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
3(a). However, a jurisprudence of insider trading has developed over the years which seeks to iden-
tify insiders by their relation to the corporation whose securities are traded, or by their knowledge of
material nonpublic information. See, eg., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (the landmark decision in which the court defined insiders as corporate direc-
tors, managers, officers, and anyone who possesses material information which (s)he knows is un-
available to the investing public), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
12 The "disclose or abstain" rule that anyone in possession of material, nonpublic information is
subject to a duty either to disclose it or refrain from trading originated in the decision of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982); SECuRrrIs AcTs AMENDMENTS, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975), quoted in United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) (Burger, J.,
dissenting) (the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act were enacted largely "to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preference or advantages among investors.")
14 See Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1968).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982). Since the SEC is not authorized to bring criminal prosecution, it
will transmit its evidence to the Attorney General who will decide whether or not the Justice De-
partment will institute criminal proceedings. See id. at § 78u(d).
16 Comment, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider Trading Regula-
tions and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Switzerland, 7 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 541, 555-56 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Effect of Secrecy].
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1985).
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associated with each transaction, and furnishes the names and addresses
of each account holder.18
A formal investigation may follow.19 The SEC will then subpoena
witnesses to testify and require the production of any books, papers, cor-
respondence, memoranda or other records which it deems relevant to the
inquiry.2" If necessary, the SEC may rely on the assistance of a federal
district court in enforcing compliance with its subpoena.2 1 If the investi-
gation produces evidence of a securities law violation, the SEC may order
an administrative hearing to determine responsibility and impose sanc-
tions.22 The SEC may also initiate suit in federal district court to enjoin
a securities law violator,2 3 obtain a recission order,2 4 and obtain an order
for the disgorgement of any profits realized.2
In the situation described above, if the broker/dealer discloses that
it executed the transaction in question on behalf of a United States bank
or other financial institution, the SEC may insist that the institution re-
veal the identify of the customer on whose behalf the broker/dealer
traded.26 Although the United States does have a law limiting the gov-
ernment's access to financial information, the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978,27 the identity of persons trading in securities cannot be
withheld from authorized government agents.28 The Supreme Court's
holding that a criminal defendant "has no protectable Fourth Amend-
ment interest in his own financial records maintained by his bank" 29 ap-
plies equally to alleged violations of securities laws.30
If, however, the institution placing the order were a Swiss bank,
when asked to comply with an SEC request for information regarding the
identity of the customer on whose behalf the bank traded, the Swiss bank
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1985). See also Greene, United States-
Swiss Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. Rav. 26 (Jan. 1983).
19 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982).
21 Note that according to § 15(b) of the Exchange Act, administrative proceedings can only be
brought against persons or firms which are registered with the SEC or in relation to securities regis-
tered with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a).
22 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b).
24 See, e.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affid with modifica-
tions, 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1973).
25 See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833.
26 See Greene, supra note 18, at 26.
27 Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982)).
28 See Greene, supra note 18, at 26.
29 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
30 See Note, Recent Hope, supra note 3, at 321.
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would in all likelihood refuse to cooperate."1 Swiss bank secrecy laws
currently prohibit bankers from disclosing confidential customer infor-
mation to foreign governments.32 An exception exists, however, where
foreign governments seek law enforcement assistance to prosecute of-
fenses which are also crimes under Swiss law. 33 Given that insider trad-
ing is presently legal in Switzerland, strict Swiss secrecy laws effectively
nullify SEC requests for assistance.3 4 If a Swiss banker were to disclose a
customer's identity, the banker would necessarily violate various provi-
sions of the Swiss Penal Code35 and the 1934 Banking Law36 and could
be prosecuted criminally. The banker would simultaneously be subject
to civil sanctions for violating Swiss contract law37 and for denying the
customer a fundamental right to financial privacy.38 Finally, the
banker's bank might even lose its license to operate because of the
31 See Greene, supra note 18, at 27.
32 It is a crime under article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code to disclose to a foreign authority
protected information of an economic nature. Article 273 provides:
Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign governmental agency
or a foreign organization or private enterprise, or to an agent of any of them, shall be subject to
imprisonment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a penitentiary.
STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 273. For discussion of art. 273, see infra notes 72-73 and accompany-
ing text.
33 For discussion of dual criminality requirement with regard to article 8(2) of the MAT, see
infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. Since annulment of bank secrecy is a compulsory mea-
sure, it cannot be ordered without this requirement. See Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss
Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United States Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 17 (1983).
34 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 130.
35 Disclosing confidential facts thereby causing injury to one to whom the informant owes a legal
or contractual duty is punishable under STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 159. It is a crime to disclose a
business secret to a foreign source under STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 273. See Recent Develop-
ment, Extraterritoriality: Swiss Supreme Court Refuses United States Request for Information Con-
cerning Insider Trading--Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial Assistance in the Santa
Fe Case, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785 (1983), 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 456, 458 n. 11(1984) [here-
inafter Recent Development, Extraterritoriality].
36 The Federal Law Relating to Banks & Savings Banks of Nov. 8, 1934 (as amended by Federal
Law of Mar. 11, 1971) provides:
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or as an auditor or his em-
ployee, or as a member of the banking commission or as an officer or employee of its bureau,
intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his professional rule of secrecy; or anyone
who induces or attempts to induce a person to commit any such offense, shall be liable to a fine
of up to Sf50,000 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both... If the offender acted with
negligence he shall be liable to a fine up to S00,000.
AS, RO, RU, art. 47(b) [hereinafter Banking Law of 1934].
37 The Swiss banker is under an implied contractual duty to respect his client's financial privacy.
See Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 18, 24 (1978). See also Honegger, supra note 33, at 3.
38 The Civil Code provides protection under the Protection of Personality and Complaint for
Injury, ZGB, C.c. COD. civ., art. 28. A tort action may also be brought for damages due to disclo-
sure of identity under the Code of Obligations, OR, C.o., COD. OBL., arts. 41 & 49. See Recent
Development, Extraterritoriality, supra note 35, at 458 n.10.
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banker's unlawful disclosure of confidential information.39
In sum, if the suspicious transaction has been effected through a
Swiss bank, the Swiss bank secrecy laws will impede the SEC's ability to
identify the account holder who authorized the transaction. Without the
trader's identity, the SEC is incapable of determining whether the person
is an insider for purposes of prosecution. By hiding behind the protective
cloak of Swiss bank secrecy, inside traders go largely undetected and
avoid punishment. Thus, Swiss bank secrecy laws not only thwart SEC
efforts to enforce securities laws, but they create a double standard of
justice and create tensions in United States-Swiss foreign relations.
It is impossible to measure precisely how much insider trading is
conducted through Swiss banks.' Yet the volume of Swiss bank trading
on United States securities markets is known to be significant and grow-
ing.4 The Swiss are regarded as "by far the largest foreign traders on
Wall Street."'42 In 1981, the Swiss traded $14.8 billion of the $75 billion
total traded by foreigners on United States stock markets.43 By 1984 the
volume of Swiss trading grew to over $20 billion as total foreign trading
increased to $124 billion.' Swiss trading has and continues to account
for approximately one-sixth of all foreign trading on United States secur-
ities markets .4  Given that recent advances in telecommunications and
computer technology have made long-distance trading less complicated,
it is expected that foreign as well as Swiss trading in United States stocks
will become even more active. Expanding opportunities for trading prof-
itably on United States markets will attract more legitimate and illegiti-
mate traders alike. Hence, it is not surprising that the SEC is concerned
with sending out signals to criminals that unlawful trading on United
States markets will not be tolerated. It is against this backdrop that the
SEC has decided to clamp down on inside traders who hide their ille-
gally-obtained profits behind the protective shield of Swiss bank secrecy
laws.
39 See Greene, supra note 18, at 27.
40 See Note, Recent Hope, supra note 3, at 306.
41 Address by Michael Mann, Chief of the Office of International Legal Assistance, SEC En-
forcement Division, in Zurich (Nov. 12, 1985) (discussing International Legal Assistance in Securi-
ties Law Enforcement).
42 Note, Recent Hope, supra note 3, at 307.
43 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D13, col. 6.
44 Foreign Activity in U.S. Securities, 8 SEc. INDUS. ASS'N 4 (1984).
45 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 1.
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III. Swiss BANK SECRECY LAWS
A. Origins of Bank Secrecy
"Banking secrecy means that the banks must keep secret any infor-
mation about their clients regarding privacy and property which they
receive by practicing their business."4 6 Bank officers, employees, and per-
sons directly related to the bank are all required to keep secret informa-
tion regarding customer accounts. This duty is derived from four
different sources of Swiss law: 1) the personality right to financial pri-
vacy, 2) the banker's contractual duty to keep a client's records secret,
3) various provisions of the Swiss Penal Code which criminalize viola-
tions of general secrecy, and 4) the 1934 Banking Law which criminalizes
violations of bank secrecy.
L Civil Law Personality Rights
Like the professional secrecy obligations of clergymen, lawyers, and
physicians, bankers' secrecy obligations are derived from the civil law's47
recognition of the right to personal privacy. In civil law countries, pro-
tection of the right to privacy-the right of an individual to be left alone,
to live a life in seclusion, or to live free from unwarranted publicity-is
considered an element of a person's personality rights.4 8 Personality
rights include protection of physical and intellectual integrity, health,
family, life, and financial affairs.49 Today, remedies for infringements of
personality rights are enumerated in civil law countries' constitutions
and statutes. Individuals whose privacy has been invaded may sue for
relief or damages, or both.5"
Common law countries, in contrast, recognize a right to privacy
which is less pervasive. In the United States, for example, although most
states recognize a private cause of action for instances of privacy inva-
sion, a constitutional right to privacy is more narrowly defined. Privacy
protection via the United States Constitution extends primarily to "fun-
damental rights." Fundamental rights pertain largely to highly personal
activities, such as freedom of choice in marital, sexual, and reproductive
matters.
51
46 The civil law system is one of two major legal systems in the western world. Two notable
characteristics of civil law systems are the codification of much private law and the strong influence
of Roman law. See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 544 n.29.
47 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 20.
48 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 544.
49 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 21.
50 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 545.
51 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the Constitution protects the right to
marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 533 (1942) (the Constitution protects the rights to
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While both civil and common law countries protect rights to privacy
by conferring secrecy obligations on certain professionals, the two legal
systems' perception of the nature of the banker-client relationship differ
dramatically.52 Unlike the United States, where the banker-client rela-
tionship is regarded as an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship, the same
relationship in Switzerland is treated as much more than an ordinary
business relationship. "Possessing a deeper insight into the financial af-
fairs of his customer than the government, or the client's family, the
banker [in Switzerland] is considered a person of confidence and trust,
much in the same way as a clergyman, physician, or lawyer." 3 It is not
surprising therefore that breaches of professional secrecy obligations in
Switzerland result in criminal prosecution,54 whereas in the United
States similar breaches result only in disciplinary action by professional
organizations.
Bank secrecy laws in Switzerland are thus intended to protect the
customer's personality right to financial privacy. The personal right to
privacy which is the basis for bank secrecy is enunciated in Article 28 of
the Swiss Civil Code.
2. Swiss Contract Law
Swiss contract law provides the second basis for banking secrecy.
Bankers have a contractual duty to keep their customers' records secret.
This duty, derived from the law of agency, is implied; it does not depend
upon express agreement. 6 Disclosure is an actionable breach of con-
tract. To establish the banker's liability, the customer must prove: 1) the
damages sustained by the disclosure, 2) breach of contract by the banker,
i.e., the disclosure and 3) cause in fact and proximate cause, i.e., that the
damages were caused foreseeably by the disclosed information.57 There
is even a rebuttable presumption of fault against the banker. The
banker's duty of nondisclosure remains in effect after the deposit contract
ends and continues as long as protection of the client's interest de-
marriage and procreation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Constitution protects a woman's
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy).
52 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 21.
53 Id. See also Navickas, supra note 3, at 167; Greene, supra note 18, at 27.
54 Clergymen, lawyers, notaries, auditors, and physicians who divulge a client's secrets face im-
prisonment for between three days and three years and/or a fine of up to Sf40,000. See STFB, C.P.,
COD. PEN., art. 321.
55 "Where anyone is being injured in his person or reputation by another's unlawful action, he
can apply to the judge for an injunction." See ZGB, C.c., COD. CIV., art. 28.
56 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 546; see also Note, Recent Hope, supra note
3, at 318.
57 OR, C.o., COD. OBL., arts. 42, 43, 44 & 99(3).
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mands.58 Suit may be brought not only against the banker, but also
against the bank itself, which is vicariously liable for the breaches of its
agents.59
Since suit may be brought against the banker and the bank for
breaches committed by its employees, numbered or coded accounts are
sometimes used. A numbered account is one for which the customer is
designated by a four-digit number instead of by name.6" It is often erro-
neously assumed that numbered accounts receive special treatment under
Swiss law. This is not the case.61 Numbered accounts are subject to the
same legal provisions as are all other kinds of accounts. The secrecy
obligation applies equally to and to the same extent as all other types of
accounts.62
The purpose behind using numbered accounts is to reduce the
chance of unauthorized disclosure. By referring to the depositor by
number instead of by name in bank communications, it is less likely that
a bank employee will commit an indiscretion.6 3 Under the Agreement
between the Swiss Bankers' Association and the Swiss National Bank on
the Observance of Care by Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Prac-
tice of Banking Secrecy, the banks bind themselves not to open any new
account without first identifying its beneficial owner. In addition, they
bind themselves not to support the flight of capital or tax evasion. 64 If
the owner is suspect, the bank is not required to inform the authorities,
but is obliged to immediately abandon business relations with the suspi-
cious client.65 Failure to comply with the terms of the above agreement
may result in an assessed penalty of up to ten million Swiss francs.
66
Because Swiss banks have recently become sensitive to the charge of
indiscriminately opening accounts into which criminals deposit illegally-
obtained money, Swiss banks are increasingly reluctant to open new
numbered accounts.67 Coded accounts are now granted only when the
depositor is already a customer of the bank or when the depositor dem-
onstrates a good reason for wanting added protection. 68 Thus, the per-
58 See id. art. 101(1).
59 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 3.
60 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 547 n.59.
61 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 28.
62 Id
63 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 548.
64 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 8.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 28.
68 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 548 n.63.
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centage of coded accounts is small.69 Contrary to popular belief, purely
anonymous accounts do not exist in Switzerland.7 0 Although the ordi-
nary bank employee will not know the identity of the beneficial owner of
a numbered account, at least one or more senior executives must know
the owner's identity. Numbered accounts are then, "nothing but an in-
ternal technical device to help banks avoid secrecy violations by their
employees."7 1
3. Swiss Penal Code Provisions
The Swiss Penal Code contains various provisions which criminalize
breaches of secrecy. Article 273 makes it criminal to disclose a business
secret to a foreign source, if it is in Switzerland's national interest to keep
such information secret, or if third persons with an interest worthy of
protection have not consented in advance to disclosure.72 Disclosure
may result in imprisonment, fine, or, in severe cases, penal servitude.73
Under Article 159 of the Code, if disclosure of confidential business in-
formation results in impairment of a client's resources, the individual
causing the loss may be charged with "unfaithful management."' Arti-
cle 271 of the Code makes it a violation of Swiss sovereignty for any
foreign government to request a Swiss resident to perform acts within
Swiss borders without the express permission of the Swiss government.
This provision applies to official contacts with United States government
employees or agents, though the mail, over the telephone, or in meetings
in Switzerland.75
4. The Banking Law of 1934
The Banking Law of 193476 affords bank secrecy a fourth protec-
tion. While the Banking Law criminalizes violations of bank secrecy,
this was not the express purpose for its enactment. 77 Rather, it was in-
tended primarily to provide the proper government supervision of bank-
ing activities needed to guard against bank collapses similar to those
experienced during the Great Depression in the United States.78 Addi-
69 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 28 n.55.
70 H. BAR, THE BANKING SYSTEM OF SWITZERLAND 61 (1957).
71 See Honegger, supra note 37, at 5.
72 STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 273.
73 See Note, Recent Hope, supra note 3, at 306 n.20.
74 Navickas, supra note 3, at 168.
75 Id.
76 See Banking Law of 1934, supra note 36.
77 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 168.
78 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 546 n.51.
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tionally, the Banking Law served a political purpose. Consonant with
Switzerland's long-standing tradition of offering refuge to those fleeing
religious, political, and racial persecution, the Banking Law sought to
protect Jews and their assets from pillage by the Nazis.7 9 To facilitate
Nazi efforts to confiscate property owned by Jews and other "enemies of
the state," the Nazis enacted a law making it a crime, punishable by
death, to hold assets in a foreign country." To ferret out funds suspected
of being "enemy" holdings, Hitler sent Gestapo agents into Switzerland
who pressured Swiss bankers to reveal information relating to German
client accounts."1 The Swiss Parliament drafted Article 47 in an effort to
discourage further cooperation with the Nazis. Article 47 made punish-
able by imprisonment or fine the disclosure of confidential information
acquired in the course of providing banking services, as well as the at-
tempt to induce others to disclose such confidential information."2
Article 47 of the Banking Law, which is public law, 3 codifies ex-
isting private law84 protection of bank secrecy found in the Civil Code
and Code of Obligations." Interestingly, this Federal Banking Law does
not describe the requirements of the duty to respect banking secrecy.
Rather, Article 47 merely prescribes penalties for violations of banking
secrecy comprehensively defined in cantonal codes.8 6 (Switzerland is a
79 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 168. See dlso Address by True Davis, former United States
Ambassador to Switzerland (June 1965), quoted in Greene, supra note 18, at 27-28:
Switzerland's tradition of neutrality has repeatedly made Switzerland a haven for refugees of
religious, political, and racial persecution. In the 17th century, thousands of French Huguenots
fleeing religious persecution came to Switzerland. Some of those became bankers and for obvi-
ous reasons had to maintain secrecy regarding their affairs with clients back in their homeland.
A situation came about when a stream of French refugees poured into Switzerland following the
French Revolution. A direct connection between Swiss neutrality and banking secrecy is seen
in the fact that it was Hitler's persecution of the Jews which led to the Banking Law of
1934 ....
80 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 547.
81 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 26.
82 See Banking Law of 1934, supra note 36.
83 Public law is:
[t]hat branch or department of law which is concerned with the state in its political or sovereign
capacity, including constitutional and administrative law, and with the definition, regulation
and enforcement of rights in cases where the state is regarded as the subject of the right or
object of the duty, including criminal law and criminal procedure...
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (5th ed. 1979).
84 Private law is:
all that part of the law which is administered between citizen and citizen, or which is concerned
with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in
whom the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are private
individuals.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979).
85 See ZGB, C.C., COD. CiV., art. 28; OR, C.O., COD. OBL., arts. 41 & 49.
86 See Banking Law of 1934, supra note 36.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:318(1985)
confederation of twenty-six cantons loosely organized into a republic.87)
The functions of its weak central government are to "manage foreign
affairs, control arms and alcohol, regulate the currency and run the rail-
roads ... everything else is left to the cantons."88
As most criminal, civil, and administrative cases are heard before
cantonal courts, 89 so too are alleged violations of banking secrecy. In
such cases, judges will apply cantonal procedural and substantive law to
determine whether a banker has breached secrecy duties; if so, the judge
will select an appropriate punishment from those enumerated in the
Banking Law. 90 What constitutes a breach of banking secrecy varies
widely, depending upon the canton involved.9'
B. Exceptions to Bank Secrecy
1. Public Law Limitations
"The fact that bank secrecy is primarily of private law character,
although recognized and sanctioned by the [public] Banking Law, has
far-reaching consequences. Given the supremacy of public over pri-
vate law, secrecy must yield whenever the public law stipulates a duty
inconsistent with private law.93 Consequently, one of the many excep-
tions to the bank secrecy rule lies within a banker's public law duty to
provide information and testify in judicial proceedings.
94
Circumstances under which bankers are obliged to testify and di-
vulge bank secrets to Swiss authorities are determined by federal and
cantonal law.95 Criminal procedure is governed primarily by cantonal
legislation.96 Each cantonal code of criminal procedure, as well as the
87 T. FEHRENBACH, THE Swiss BANKS 11 (1966).
88 Id.
89 "The bulk of criminal, civil, and administrative cases takes place before cantonal courts...
which follow cantonal procedural codes and apply the substantive law of both the confederation and
the cantons at the same time. Federal procedural laws are applied only before the Federal Supreme
Court... " Meyer, supra note 37, at 31 n.82.
90 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 547. If the substantive provisions of federal
law are to supercede cantonal procedural law, such will always be expressly mentioned in the federal
law. As the Banking Law of 1934 contains no such exception, cantonal procedural law is controlling
in cases of bank secrecy violations. See Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
360, 367 (1969).
91 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 170.
92 Meyer, supra note 3, at 27.
93 Id.
94 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 550.
95 Article 47(4) of the Banking Law of 1934 provides that "Federal and cantonal regulations
concerning the obligation to testify and furnish information to a government authority shall remain
reserved." See supra note 36.
96 Id. See Honegger, supra note 33, at 6.
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Federal Law of Criminal Procedure, confers a duty upon third persons to
testify and furnish documents in criminal proceedings. Whereas clergy-
men, physicians, lawyers, and the accused are exempt from this duty,
bankers must always cooperate in criminal proceedings.97 Bank secrecy,
therefore, may never be invoked to override the public duty to testify in
criminal proceedings.98
In civil proceedings, however, the particular canton law determines
if bankers are required to testify and furnish documents. All twenty-six
cantonal codes of civil procedure recognize a general duty of third per-
sons to testify and furnish documents in civil proceedings, but each dif-
fers on exemptions for those in possession of financial secrets.99 The
various cantonal codes fall into three general categories. In eleven can-
tons, including Lucerne, persons entitled to refuse to testify are specifi-
cally enumerated; bankers are absent from the list.l"° In six cantons,
including Zurich, the judge is permitted, by balancing the respective in-
terests involved, to decide whether an exemption should be granted in
each particular case.101 The Federal Law of Civil Procedure takes the
same approach.10 ' In eight cantons, including Geneva and Berne, bank-
ers are generally entitled to refuse to testify concerning professional
secrets. 103
2. Debtor and Bankruptcy Limitations
Bank secrecy may also be broken in order to collect debts or con-
duct bankruptcy proceedings. 1° Debtors cannot hide their assets behind
bank secrecy statutes to avoid paying their debts.10 5 Thus, a debt collec-
tion agency has a right to information if it is needed to pay off credi-
tors. 10 6  Even without prior commencement of a debt collection
proceeding, a bank account may be attached for monetary claims if the
account's owner has no fixed place of residence in Switzerland or is likely
to evade legal obligations. 10 7 In the later stages of the attachment pro-
97 Id.
98 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 551.
99 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 31.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 32.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id at 35.
105 See The Federal Law Concerning the Execution of Debts and Bankruptcy of Apr. 11, 1889,
RS 281.1, arts. 222, 224, 228 [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Law].
106 See generally M. AUBERT, I. KERNEN, & H. SCHOENLE, LE SECRET BANCAIRE 122-34 (2d
ed. 1982).
107 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 35.
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ceeding, the creditor usually acquires a right to learn about the nature
and size of the attached property.
10 8
In bankruptcy proceedings against the bank itself, bank secrecy laws
may also be overridden. 0 9 It is thought that the privacy rights of a few
bank customers should give way to creditors' rights to know the bank's
business. 110
3. A Customer's Waiver of the Right to Secrecy
Since bank secrecy is primarily a private law matter, it follows that
the customer and not the bank is master of the secret.11' Thus, the right
to financial privacy can be waived if the client authorizes the bank to
release confidential information to the Swiss government or a third
party." 2 This waiver takes on added significance when the third party
recipient of the information is a foreign governmental authority. 113  Ac-
cording to the Swiss Supreme Court, if a customer does not affirmatively
waive the right to financial privacy, the desire to maintain confidentiality
must be presumed. The presumption may be overcome, however, by
proof of explicit authorization or a manifest willingness to allow
disclosure.' 14
IV. TREATY ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
Assuming a customer waives the right to secrecy, the SEC, intent on
investigating alleged insider trading violations, may still be barred in its
access to the released information. Swiss bankers are permitted to di-
vulge secrets to Swiss but not foreign authorities.' Foreign authorities
must request judicial assistance through their diplomatic missions, unless
there is a special agreement. All such requests must be addressed to the
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 The Bankruptcy Law, supra note 105, art. 323.
111 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 29.
112 Id. Note, however, that one may envision a scenario where a customer waives his personal
right to financial privacy and is later prosecuted for violating article 273 by releasing confidential
information to a foreign government without the permission of the Swiss government. See infra note
32. Remember that article 273 protects a public interest-Switzerland's right to economic sover-
eignty. Remember also that in civil law countries it is public law which controls in the face of
contrary private law. A conflict of this sort is intimated in the Santa Fe case, discussed infra note
162 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver in the context of a
United States federal court ordering that secrecy be waived. See also infra note 235 for a discussion
of the Bankers' Agreement stipulation that traders on the United States securities markets are re-
quired to waive their rights to secrecy as a condition to trading on the United States market.
114 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 29.
115 See STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 273, supra note 32.
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Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police. The Department, in
turn, forwards the requests to the competent cantonal court which rules
on the requests.'1 6 Annulling bank secrecy is a "compulsory measure,"
consequently a cantonal court may only do so if it is expressly provided
for under Swiss law or a ratified treaty."1 ' Treatment of United States
requests for judicial assistance is often governed by the United States-
Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters. 118
Efforts to conclude a legal assistance treaty in criminal matters be-
tween the United States and Switzerland began prior to World War II.119
Yet not until 1973, after five years of arduous negotiation, did the two
nations sign the Treaty. The Treaty did not become operative for an
additional four years.120 MAT is the first judicial assistance treaty in
criminal matters signed between two countries with completely different
legal systems-one, common law, the other, civil law. It is precisely in
the area of criminal proceedings that divergence between civil and com-
mon law is most significant.'21
The motives of the signatory nations for entering into the agreement
differed greatly. Switzerland sought a comprehensive agreement cover-
ing all aspects of judicial assistance, similar to the European Convention
on Mutual Assistance Matters, yet protective of Switzerland's personal-
ity rights.'22 The Swiss would not agree to the "comparatively intrusive"
discovery proceedings commonly used in the United States.'23 Mean-
while, the United States sought an agreement conducive to piercing the
Swiss secrecy veil, particularly to prosecute tax, securities, and organized
crime offenders.' 24 The final agreement represents a compromise of the
parties' competing interests.25
Assistance under the Treaty includes locating witnesses, taking
statements and testimony, producing and preserving business records, at-
taching assets, and extending service of judicial and administrative docu-
116 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 8.
117 Id. at 9.
118 See MAT, supra note 4.
119 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 63.
120 "The lengthy period between signing and effectiveness was partially due to the elaborate ratifi-
cation process and Switzerland's need to extract an Execution Law to the Treaty." Meyer, supra
note 37, at 64 n.270. "[Tihe Treaty required enactment of regulations which must have the force of
law, (for example, specification of the competence of the federal and central authorities) and legal
rights of appeal to challenge decisions of these authorities." Greene, supra note 18, at 29.
121 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 13.
122 Id. at 14.
123 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 172.
124 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 14.
125 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 64.
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ments. 126 Assistance under the Treaty is compulsory for investigations
related to the prosecution of offenses which constitute crimes in both
countries. 127 Given that insider trading, per se, is not presently a crime
under Swiss law, the requirement of dual criminality takes on tremen-
dous importance in the insider trading context.
12 8
The Treaty contains a schedule of thirty-five named offenses which
permit the use of compulsory measures. 129 Offenses such as murder, kid-
napping, larceny, extortion, fraud, arson, and perjury are included. No-
tably absent are violations of the securities, antitrust, and tax laws.
While the Swiss do not condone such activities, they do not regard them
as crimes under Swiss law. 130 For offenses not listed in the schedule, but
which constitute crimes in both the United States and Switzerland, the
Swiss Division of Police will determine whether the offense is significant
enough to justify the use of compulsory measures; if so, assistance will be
granted. 3 I Left unclear is whether the Swiss Division of Police will treat
United States securities violations as "fraud" under the schedule for pur-
poses of extending assistance under the Treaty. Trading on the basis of
non-public information constitutes fraud in the United States where it is
both a civil and criminal violation of securities laws. Unfortunately, in-
sider trading has no readily identifiable counterpart under Swiss penal
law. Of the offenses listed in the schedule, the offense which comes clos-
est by analogy to violations of the United States securities laws is
"fraud." Consequently, it is unclear whether the Swiss Division of Police
will regard securities violations as triggering the use of compulsory
measures. 132
The MAT excludes "foreign, political, military and fiscal of-
fenses" 133 from its application. Consequently, Switzerland is entitled to
refuse assistance if such cooperation would threaten the "public order."
MAT's "public order" clause makes assistance under the Treaty discre-
tionary if such assistance is likely to "prejudice the sovereignty, security,
public policy or similar essential interests" of the assisting state. 13
The degree to which the public order clause may be invoked to de-
feat a request for assistance to protect bank secrecy thus becomes a cru-
126 See MAT, supra note 4, art. 1(4).
127 Id. art. 4.
128 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 18.
129 See MAT, supra note 4 (Schedule of Offenses for which compulsory measures are available).
130 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 172.
131 See MAT, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
132 See Greene, supra note 18, at 29.
133 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 64.
134 See MAT, supra note 4, art. 3(1)(a).
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cial issue. Although MAT itself does not specifically address this
question, MAT correspondence between the United States and Swiss am-
bassadors provides some insight.'35 It is generally believed that legal
assistance cannot be refused simply because a banking secret is af-
fected. 36 Article 3(2) of MAT indicates that refusal to cooperate is in-
tended to be a rare exception. 3 7 Hence, only if assistance would effect a
serious breach of secrecy protection-for example, if a bank were asked
to disclose relationships with a large number of its customers not in-
volved in the alleged crime or large transactions important to the Swiss
economy 138-could invocation of the public order clause successfully de-
feat a request for assistance.
Incorporated in the Treaty is the Swiss doctrine of "specialty." Spe-
cialty requires that information obtained under the Treaty be used only
in the proceeding for which it was requested.' 39 Thus, information may
not be requested and obtained under criminal charges and then be used
in an unrelated fiscal prosecution or civil proceeding." The Treaty
leaves unanswered the question of whether information obtained under
the Treaty by the United States Department of Justice for use in criminal
proceedings against alleged inside traders may be turned over to the SEC
for use in related civil proceedings. Given that few securities violations
are prosecuted criminally, if special dispensation were not granted for
insider trader investigations, the SEC's enforcement efforts would be se-
verely frustrated. 4' In sum, it is the unsettled status that MAT accords
United States securities violations and SEC investigations which creates
loopholes which inside traders utilizing Swiss banking facilities may
exploit.
V. THE APPROACH OF UNITED STATES COURTS
The major loopholes left open in MAT gave the SEC no choice but
to resort to the use of United States federal court discovery orders in
135 See Letters of May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2120, T.I.A.S. No. 8302, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 969-71 (1973), where the United States and Swiss Ambassadors expressed their mutual
understanding that under the 'public order" clause, article 3(1), a requested state could refuse
assistance.
136 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 65.
137 See MAT, supra note 4, art. 3(2).
138 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 65.
139 Article 5(1) provides that any information obtained under the Treaty "shall not be used for
investigative purposes nor be introduced into evidence in the requesting state in any proceeding
relating to an offense other than the offense for which assistance has been granted." See MAT, supra
note 4, art. 5(1).
140 See Meyer, supra note 37, at 55.
141 See Greene, supra note 18, at 30.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:318(1985)
order to nullify the effect of Swiss banking secrecy in insider trading
prosecutions. Edward Greene, former General Counsel of the SEC con-
ceded in January of 1983 that the MAT was of limited usefulness to the
SEC. 142 As of that date, the Treaty had never been successfully used to
prosecute an inside trader.
14 3
The case of SEC v. Banca Della Svizzeria Italiana144 ("BSI") illus-
trates how the SEC can use federal court discovery orders to expose in-
siders who trade illegally on United States securities markets and attempt
to hide behind the protective veil of Swiss bank secrecy laws. In BSI the
SEC sought an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
compelling BSI to identify the customers on whose behalf it purchased
certain stock and call options145 or to pay stiff penalties.
On March 10, 1981, BSI bought stock and call options of St. Joe
Minerals Corp. ("St. Joe") on the New York and Philadelphia Stock Ex-
changes. One day later, Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. announced a
cash tender offer 146 for all St. Joe common stock. Immediately thereaf-
ter, BSI closed out its stock option purchases and sold 2,000 of the 3,000
shares of common stock it purchased on March 10. Overnight, the pur-
chasers made a profit of approximately two million dollars. 147
The sudden increase in market activity triggered a preliminary SEC
investigation. The SEC suspected that persons with knowledge of the
tender offer made the purchases and that such knowledge could only
have come from sources who had a duty either to refrain from trading or
to keep the information confidential prior to public announcement of the
tender offer.' 48 The SEC then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York alleging insider trading by
the bank and its principals. The SEC obtained a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") freezing some of BSI's assets held in an Irving Trust
Company account which were thought to be the proceeds of the suspect
transactions. 149 The TRO also directed the bank to disclose the identity
142 Id. at 29.
143 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 563.
144 92 F.R.D. II1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
145 "A 'call' is a negotiable options contract by which the bearer has the right to buy from the
writer of the contract a certain number of shares of a particular stock at a fixed price on or before a
certain agreed-upon date." Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 558 n. 163.
146 "A 'tender offer' is an offer to purchase shares made by one company to the stockholders of
another company. It is communicated to the stockholders by newspaper advertisement, and if the
offeror can obtain a shareholder list, by a general mailing to all stockholders." Id. at 558 n.164.
147 See BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 113.
148 Id.
149 Over the next eight months, the SEC attempted to learn the identity of the Swiss bank clients
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of its customers, to the extent permitted by law.15
The bank refused to identify its customers, asserting that disclosure
would expose the bank to civil and criminal liability in Switzerland. In
an unusual decision, Judge Milton Pollack rendered an opinion requiring
disclosure pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 37. Non-
compliance with the discovery order would result in $50,000 per day in
fines and an order to "cease and desist from any further trading on the
US securities markets."
' 151
In deciding whether to impose sanctions on the party resisting dis-
covery when foreign law prohibits disclosure, the BSI court looked to
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations for gui-
dance.' 2 Section 40 sets forth factors to be examined in determining
which one of two conflicting national laws should be enforced when both
countries have jurisdiction and the two countries' laws require inconsis-
tent conduct. The factors are:
a) the vital national interests of the states;
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose on the persons;
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other country;
d) the nationality of the persons; and
e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reason-
ably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the
state.1 53  1
After applying Section 40, the court concluded that the relevant
considerations "tipped decisively in favor of the SEC" and application of
United States law.
15 4
In analyzing the vital national interests at stake, the court found
that the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure
the integrity of its markets was paramount. 155 As for the Swiss national
interests, the court found significant the fact that the Swiss government,
although aware of the discovery order, expressed no opposition to it.
The court also noted that the secrecy privilege could be waived in this
case without harm to the Swiss government, since Swiss bank secrecy
through interrogatories pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 33. See Navickas, supra note 3, at 174 n.75.
See also Greene, supra note 18, at 30.
150 The bank was given three business days to comply with the order. See Navickas, supra note 3,
at 174 n.76.
151 See BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 113.
152 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 559.
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
154 See BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 117.
155 Id
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laws were enacted primarily for the purpose of protecting bank custom-
ers' rights to financial privacy, not the Swiss government. The court reit-
erated the waiver provision in its discussion of hardship considerations.
While the court did acknowledge the possibility that BSI could be fined
and its officers imprisoned under Swiss law, the court also discussed ways
in which BSI could comply with United States law without violating
Swiss law. To be relieved of criminal liability under Swiss law, BSI could
obtain secrecy waivers from its customers. Even without such waivers,
BSI could still escape prosecution under the "State of Necessity" excep-
tion to Article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code if its disclosure constituted an
act committed to protect BSI's "own good" and "fortune" from an im-
mediate danger it did not cause and could not avoid. In the opinion of
the Second Circuit, the possibility that a Swiss court could hold inappli-
cable the "State of Necessity" exception-since BSI had knowingly and
in bad faith created its current dilemma-was a hardship BSI would
have to bear.
156
Finally, the court held that a foreign law's prohibition of discovery
is not an absolute bar to compelling discovery, particularly where the
party resisting discovery has acted in bad faith.157 Here, the court char-
acterized BSI as "one who deliberately courted legal impediments and
who thus cannot now be heard to assert its good faith."' 58 The Court
reasoned that sanctions were appropriate where "it would be a travesty
of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets, vio-
late American laws ... , withdraw profits and resist accountability for
itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity
under foreign law." '159
BSI demonstrates the lengths to which United States courts can and
will go to enforce domestic securities laws. Where parties resist United
States court discovery orders in bad faith, foreign bank secrecy laws will
not deter United States courts from imposing sanctions, provided factors
articulated in Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) weigh heavily in
the SEC's favor. The threat of stiff penalties worked in BSI. Within one
week after Judge Pollack's decision, the bank obtained from some of its
156 Id. at 118. Article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code states:
Present Danger: 1. An act committed by a person to save his life, person, freedom, honor, or
property from an immediate danger which cannot be averted otherwise, shall not be punishable
if the danger was not caused by the offender and further if he could not be expected under the
circumstances to make this sacrifice. If the danger was caused by the offender or if he could be
expected to make this sacrifice, the court, in its discretion, may impose a less severe sentence.
STGB, C.P., COD. PEN., art. 34.
157 See BSI, 92 F.R.D. at 114.
158 Id. at 117.
159 Id. at 119.
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customers waivers of their rights to secrecy.
160
In other cases, judicial attempts to penetrate Swiss bank secrecy
have been less successful.1 61 Just prior to the BSI decision, the SEC initi-
ated another insider trading action against unknown purchasers of call
options and common stock in Sante Fe International. 62 The SEC in-
dicted unknown traders who purchased call options and stock while in
possession of non-public information about a prospective merger between
Santa Fe International and Kuwait Petroleum. Unlike BSI, Santa Fe
involved most of the major Swiss banks.1 63 Had the court for the South-
ern District of New York ordered all the named defendants to pay steep
fines for nondisclosure, it would have imperiled the health of the entire
Swiss banking industry."' Furthermore, if the court had blocked the
banks' access to United States securities markets as it had threatened to
do in BSI, the court would have substantially undermined the smooth
operation of those markets. 6  Given that Switzerland accounts for one-
fifth of the total foreign trading on United States securities markets,
1 66
the withdrawal of the named defendants could have caused a temporary
market upheaval, or worse, a serious long-term threat to the health of
United States securities markets.' 67
160 Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 559 n. 181. See also Honegger, supra note 33, at
11 n.97:
The defendant had furnished some, but not all, of the answers to the demanded interrogatories
after a waiver of Swiss banking confidentiality was secured from the customers concerned. The
released information disclosed the names of three Panamanian corporations and one Swiss cor-
poration for whom the St. Joe options had been purchased, as well as the name of the customer
who had ordered the transactions on the corporations' behalf: Giuseppe Tomo, a close friend
and advisor of th6 head of the Seagram Company.
161 See, eg., Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning JudicialAssistance in the Santa Fe Case, 22
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785 (1983) (where the court refused a United States Department of Jus-
tice request pursuant to MAT for Swiss banking records revealing the identities of United States
citizens suspected of engaging in unlawful insider trading. The court held that the United States
failed to prove the elements of unfaithful management, fraud, or illegal disclosure of business secrets.
The alleged insider trading activity was therefore not criminal in Switzerland. Hence, assistance
under MAT was not mandated. The Swiss Federal Office of Police then denied the request for
assistance. The court's decision reaffirmed Swiss bank secrecy and set back United States efforts to
prosecute citizens who channel illegal transactions through Swiss banks). See also Recent Develop-
ment, Extraterritoriality, supra note 35, at 462-63.
162 SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock and Call Options for the Common
Stock of Santa Fe International Corporation, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981) [hereinafter Santa Fe].
163 Named as defendants were: Credit Suisse, Swiss American Securities, Inc., Citibank, N.A.,
Lombard Odier and Cie, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Swiss Bank Corp., Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., and Mosely Hallgarten Estabrook and Wee-
den, Inc. See Santa Fe, supra note 162.
164 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 177.
165 Id.
166 See text accompanying notes 43-45.
167 See Naviekas, supra note 3, at 177.
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The precariousness of the situation for both countries provided the
impetus to negotiate beneficial solution. The result is embodied in the
Memorandum of Understanding" 8 and the accompanying Bankers'
Agreement.' 6 9 The Memorandum allows the SEC to obtain information
from Swiss banks whenever the SEC can prove it has a reasonable belief
that insider trading took place through a Swiss bank. 170
VI. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
At Switzerland's invitation, the two countries first discussed en-
forcement cooperation in the field of insider trading at Bern in March,
1982; 171 discussions continued in Montreal in June, 1982.172 After two
additional days of negotiation in Washington, D.C., the countries signed,
on August 31, 1982, the Memorandum of Understanding. 173 Although
the MOU is a declaration of intent, it does not have the binding force of
an international treaty. 74 The MOU itself contains no procedural rules
for United States and Swiss treatment of future insider trading. Proce-
dural rules are contained in a private agreement of the Swiss Bankers'
Association which is referred to in the MOU.
175
The MOU is divided into five articles: 1) Introduction; 2) Exchange
of Opinions Regarding the Treaty Between the United States and Swit-
zerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; 3) Discussion of
Swiss Bankers' Association; 4) Further Consultations; and 5) Other
Understandings. 1
76
The Introduction states that both nations recognize the inherent
conflict between the SEC's interest in identifying inside traders who util-
ize Swiss banks to effect their unlawful transactions and Swiss banks'
interests in keeping secret their customers' identities. ' 7 Both nations
recognize that the differing status of insider trading under Swiss and
United States law contributes to this conflict. The nations explain that
trading on the basis of material non-public information is criminal in the
United States whereas such conduct, although dishonorable, is not per se
168 See MOU, supra note 3, at 177.
169 See BA, supra note 6.
170 See Comment, Effect of Secrecy, supra note 16, at 561.




174 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 178.
175 See MOU, supra note 5, art. 1(7).
176 See MOU, supra note 5.
177 Id. art. 1(3).
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punishable in Switzerland. 7 ' Nevertheless, the two countries renew
their commitment to providing law enforcement cooperation in the realm
of insider trading, conduct which the countries agree is detrimental to
their interests.
79
Article II of the MOU clarifies MAT in three ways which are partic-
ularly useful to the SEC. Article II 3(a) acknowledges that SEC investi-
gations fall within the scope of MAT applicability since SEC
investigations "relate to conduct which might be dealt with by the crimi-
nal courts."' 80 Prior to this acknowledgement, it was unclear whether
SEC investigations were eligible for mutual assistance, given that such
investigations usually led to civil suits and disciplinary proceedings and
rarely to criminal prosecution.'
Article II 3(b) of the MOU suggests that under the Swiss Penal
Code, the offenses of fraud, unfaithful management, and violations of
business secrets may serve as substitutes for the crime of insider trading
and for purposes of obtaining assistance under MAT, at least until the
Swiss enact their own law prohibiting insider trading.'82
Article 11 (4) of the MOU helps to clarify the meaning of Article I of
MAT which provides assistance in certain "ancillary administrative pro-
ceedings in respect of measures which may be taken against the perpetra-
tor of an offense falling within the purview of [MAT]."' 83 Article 11(4)
has been interpreted as overcoming the Swiss presumption of spe-
cialty,'8 4 the doctrine which limits the use of information only to those
proceedings for which it is obtained. With this provision, information
obtained pursuant to Article I of MAT may be used in some administra-
tive and judicial proceedings. 8 ' Switzerland has agreed to treat SEC in-
junctive and disgorgement proceedings as penal in nature, thus extending
the use of information provided under the Treaty to such proceedings.
186
As for the use of MAT information in other administrative and judicial
proceedings, the parties have not yet reached an agreement; they have,
however, agreed to exchange diplomatic notes on the subject.
187
In Article III, the parties recognize that there may be securities
178 Id. art. (2).
179 Id. art. 1(4).
180 Id. art. II(1)(a).
181 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 178.
182 See MOu, supra note 5, art. II(3)(b).
183 Id. art. 1(4).
184 See supra note 139.
185 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 179.
186 Id.
187 See MOU, supra note 5, art. 11(4).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:318(1985)
transactions effected in the United States by Swiss banks acting on behalf
of persons who possess material non-public information but which are
not covered by MAT.188 For example, assistance would not be required
in cases of insider trading which fall outside the list of thirty-five offenses
listed in the schedule or which do not constitute the Swiss crimes of
fraud, mismanagement, or unlawful disclosure of business secrets. In
sum, compulsory measures are not available under the treaty if known
information on alleged insider trading fails to indicate the existence of an
offense under the Swiss Penal Code.189 The parties note that until the
Swiss Parliament enacts legislation making insider trading a crime under
Swiss law, cooperation in insider trading investigations not covered by
the Treaty can still be obtained through a procedure adopted by the
Swiss Bankers' Association. 9 ' Under certain specified circumstances,
signatory banks to this private agreement would be permitted to disclose
the identity of a customer and certain other relevant information. 9' Ar-
ticle III (2) provides that the Swiss Bankers' Association will submit the
provisional private agreement for signature to banks in Switzerland
which may trade on United States securities markets.192 Article III (3)
sets forth certain understandings between the governments regarding
their roles with respect to the provisional agreement.1
93
Article IV provides for future contacts and consultations regarding
the SEC's use of best efforts to inform Swiss authorities about its investi-
gations and the Swiss government's use of best efforts to communicate
confidential information with due care. 194
Finally, Article V provides that the MOU "does not modify or
supercede any laws or regulations in force in the US or Switzerland,"' 195
nor confer on the bank customer the right to seek review in a United
States court of a bank's decision to reveal the customer's identity pursu-
ant to the provisional agreement.'96 The SEC's statutory powers have
therefore not been altered by MOU. The Commission remains free to
take measures outside the MOU and MAT when circumstances war-
rant. 197 Finally, the parties acknowledge the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion's pledge to use its best efforts to promptly obtain banks' signatures to




192 Id. art. 111(2).
193 Id. art. 111(3).
194 Id. art. IV(l) and IV(2)(a).
195 Id. art. V(1).
196 Id. art. V(2).
197 See Greene, supra note 18, at 34.
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the Agreement.' 98
VII. THE Swiss BANKERS' ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
The Swiss Bankers' Association lays out the formal procedure
which the SEC must follow in requesting Swiss assistance in insider trad-
ing investigations not covered by MAT. The United States Department
of Justice, acting on its own or on behalf of the SEC, sends a written
application for assistance to the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters
which, in turn, transmits the request to a specially created Commission
of Inquiry. Under certain conditions, the Commission orders the Swiss
bank involved to file a report on the transaction under review and send
the report to the Federal Office for Police Matters with instructions to
forward the report to the SEC. The Agreement, which includes a pream-
ble and 12 articles, can be subdivided into five parts:'9 9
1) the definitions of insider trading (Article 1) and insiders (Article 5);
2) a description of the Commission (Article 2) and preconditions to its
inquiries (Article 3);
3) an explanation of how the Commission procures information from
banks (Articles 4, 6, and 8) and transmits it to the Federal Office for
Police Matters (Articles 5 and 7);
4) the way in which customers' accounts may be held (Article 9); and
5) enforcement provisions (Article 10).
The Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association agreed to
appoint a Commission of Inquiry composed of three members, three dep-
uties, and a staff."° ° All Commission members and staff are bound by
Swiss banking secrecy laws2° ' and bank executives are ineligible to sit on
the Commission.2 "2
The Commission will accept SEC inquiries which relate to SEC dis-
coveries that203 a customer directed a Swiss bank to buy or sell securities
of a company involved in a business combination or acquisition before
the merger or acquisition was announced. The SEC's inquiry applica-
tions must be accompanied by: 1) confirmation of SEC willingness to
198 See MOU, supra note 15, art. III.
199 BA, supra note 6.
200 Id. art. 2(1).
201 Id. art. 2(2)j.
202 Id.
203 rd. art. 1. This article provides for no inquiry if the SEC discovers that:
within 25 trading days prior to a public announcement... of(A) a proposed merger, consolida-
tion, sale of substantially all of an issuer's assets or other similar business combination.., or
(B) the proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the securities of an issuer by open market
purchase, tender offer or otherwise... a customer gives to a bank an order to be executed in a
US securities market for the purchase or sale of securities or put on call options for securities of
any company that is a party to a business combination or the subject of an acquisition.
Id
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place at the Commission's disposal all of the information in its possession
materially relevant to the investigation;2"4 and 2) an SEC pledge not to
disclose information obtained under the Agreement to anyone outside
the SEC investigation.2 °5
Furthermore, the SEC must establish to the "reasonable satisfaction
of the Commission" that it has persuasive evidence indicating that in-
sider trading occurred. 20 6 The Commission may be satisfied if the SEC
can furnish evidence of significant price or volume changes in the stock
in question.20 7 However, the Commission must be satisfied with evidence
that either price or volume changes exceeded certain stated levels.20 8
Failure of the SEC to furnish such evidence will not necessarily result in
a presumption that no reasonable grounds for the request exist.
20 9
Rather, the Commission will then review the information submitted by
the SEC to determine whether reasonable grounds exist independent of
Article 3(4) criteria.210
If the Commission is reasonably satisfied, it will call for a report
from the bank involved in the transaction under investigation. 211  The
bank must file a report with the Commission within forty-five days which
describes the transaction in sufficient detail, including the name, address,
and nationality of the customer, to demonstrate that the transaction was
not made in violation of United States insider trading laws."'212 In addi-
tion, the Commission will require the bank to:
(a) freeze the customer's account to the extent of the profit gained or the
loss avoided due to the suspicious transaction;
213
(b) inform the customer of the Commission's inquiry;214 and
204 Id. art. 3(2).
205 Id. art. 3(5).
206 Id. art. 3(4).
207 Id. art. 3(4)(i).
208 Id. art. 3(4)(ii). The Agreement provides that the Commission shall be satisfied in all cases
where:
the daily trading volume of securities at issue increased 50% or more at any time during the 25
days prior to the announcement of an acquisition or business contribution above the average
trading volume of such securities during the period from the 19th to the 13th trading day prior
to such announcement, or 2) the price of such securities varied at least 50% or more during the




211 Id. art. 4(1).
212 Id. art. 4(2-4).
213 Id. art. 9(1). If the Commission furnishes information to the SEC, the funds will remain
blocked until proceedings in United States courts terminate. If the Commission forwards no infor-
mation, then the funds will be unblocked 30 days after the SEC is informed that it will receive no
information. Id. at art. 9(2-3).
214 Id. art. 4(2).
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(c) provide the customer an opportunity to respond to the SEC's allega-
tions within 30 days of being informed of the Commission's inquiry.
215
With the information provided by the bank, the Commission will file
its own report with the Federal Office for Police Matters.216 The Com-
mission's report is then forwarded to the SEC unless the bank or cus-
tomer establishes to the Commission's reasonable satisfaction that the
customer did not purchase or sell the securities involved in the transac-
tion or that the customer was not an insider.217 In cases in which the
accuracy of the report is questioned, the SEC or the Commission may
ask the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to examine the report.218 If
the Banking Commission determines that the bank has not complied
with its obligations under the Agreement, the Board of Directors of the
Swiss Bankers' Association will issue a warning to the bank.219 If re-
peated violations are found, the bank must be excluded from the Bank-
ers' Agreement and the Federal Banking Commission and the SEC
informed.220 Although the Federal Banking Commission retains its dis-
ciplinary powers under the Banking Law, its sanctioning power is lim-
ited.221 It cannot force the recalcitrant bank to furnish information or
block a customer's account since the Agreement is only a multilateral
contract of signatory banks and the Banking Commission is not a party
to the Agreement. 22 Other signatory banks might attempt to enforce
the contract, but under the Swiss Obligation Code the only available
remedy for contract nonperformance is money damages. Since the re-
maining signatory banks will not suffer any damages, if a bank refuses to
provide the Commission with information or fails to block a customer's
account, the Code remedy is meaningless.223
Although the Agreement does allow the SEC to request the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission to examine whether a report furnished by
215 Id.
216 Id. art. 5.
217 Id. art. 5(1-2). For purposes of the Agreement, an insider is defined as:
a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor, or a mandated person of the company or an
assistant of any one of them, or
b) a member of a public authority or public officer who in the execution of his public duty
received information about an acquisition or business combination, or
c) a person who, on the basis of information about an acquisition or business combination
received from a person described in a) or b) has been able to act for the latter or to benefit
himself from inside information.
Id. art. 5(2).
218 id. art. 8.
219 Id. art. 10.
220 Id.
221 See Id. art. 8.
222 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 35.
223 OR, C.o., COD., OBL., art. 97(1).
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a bank conforms to the facts and to the present Agreement,2 24 the Agree-
ment contains no provision for a review of a Commission determination
that a report need not be filed. The MOU states that if the Commission
"arrives at the conclusion that a client is not an insider as defined by the
private Agreement, the SEC will judge this opinion as one made in good
faith.,
225
The Bankers's Agreement is provisional; it is to be in force for a
three-year period from January 1, 1983 and is renewable thereafter on a
year-to-year basis.226 Provision is made for signatory banks to terminate
their compliance with the Agreement. 227 The Agreement will be abro-
gated if and when the Swiss Parliament enacts legislation making the
misuse of inside information a crime. 22 8 When insider trading becomes a
crime in Switzerland, the need for the Bankers Agreement will be obvi-
ated and law enforcement assistance in a wide range of inside trading
cases will become available under the existing Mutual Assistance Treaty.
VIII. EXISTING LIMITATIONS
The MOU and its companion BA clearly represent vast improve-
ments over past practices by facilitating SEC investigations of insider
trading violations concealed by Swiss bank secrecy laws. Use of the
MOU and BA is preferable to the adversarial approach of United States
court orders compelling discovery and assessing stiff penalties for non-
compliance. As noted above, these unilateral efforts produce effects
which are mutually disadvantageous to the United States and Switzer-
land. They threaten the livelihood of Swiss banks and the United States
securities markets on which Swiss banks trade heavily. Furthermore, in-
ternational relations are strained when the United States accuses Switzer-
land of conspiring with those who evade United States securities laws
and Switzerland retorts that the extraterritoriality of United States secur-
ities law and the presence of its enforcement agents in Switzerland un-
duly encroach upon Swiss sovereignty.
Together the MOU and BA seek to clarify the ambiguities inherent
in the MAT which are thought to have rendered the Treaty's utility to
the SEC debatable. Moreover, the MOU and BA extend assistance to a
new category of cases not presently covered by the Treaty. The Treaty's
strict requirement that insider trading offenses be matched with the nar-
224 See BA, supra note 6, art. 8.
225 See MOU, supra note 5, art. 111(3).
226 See BA, supra note 6, art. 11.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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rowly-defined Swiss crimes of fraud, unfaithful management, and unlaw-
ful business disclosure necessarily limits assistance to a fraction of cases.
Unfortunately, the MOU and BA have their share of limitations as well.
The most obvious and severe limitation of the BA is that it applies
only to insider trading investigations of securities transactions which pre-
cede the public announcement of mergers and acquisitions.22 9 The BA
would not, for example, apply to facts similar to those found in Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,23 where insider information pertained not to an up-
coming merger or acquisition, but to the company's discovery of oil
which caused its stock to soar in value. Furthermore, the BA generally
applies only to cases involving high levels of trading in affected securities
over a short period of time.23' Hence, the BA affords the SEC little
assistance in a multitude of trading cases which constitute crimes in the
United States, but which represent only dishonorable conduct in
Switzerland.
Not only is insider trading defined narrowly under the BA, but so
too is the definition of who is an "insider." '232 It appears that low-level
corporate executives, bankers, news reporters, and stock exchange offi-
cials who are not employees of the company, but who obtain inside infor-
mation in the course of their work, fall outside the scope of the BA.
They do not fit the BA's definition of insiders, either as company employ-
ees, or as "tippees" who discover material information on their own.233
Note, however, that such persons might well be considered insiders
under United States law.
234
To implement the BA, signatory banks have asked their customers
to sign waivers of banking secrecy allowing the banks to comply with any
Commission of Inquiry requests for information.235 Without such a
waiver, signatory banks will refuse to place a client's order for securities
in the United States.236 Client waivers are only effective prospectively.
229 rd art. 1.
230 See Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833.
231 See BA, supra note 6, art. 3(4). See also Navickas, supra note 3, at 184.
232 See BA, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
233 See Note, Recent Hope, supra note 3, at 316-17.
234 Id. at 316. See, eg., Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (in dicta the Supreme Court indi-
cated that if a "tippee" passes along to investors information which he knows or should know is
material, nonpublic, and the product of a corporate insider's breach of a fiduciary duty, then the
"tippee" violates Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also United States v.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (it is the existence of a fiduciary relationship and not mere possession
of material, nonpublic information which imposes upon "tippees" a duty to disclose such informa-
tion under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
235 See BA, supra note 6, art. 12; see also Navickas, supra note 3, at 182.
236 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 183.
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Consequently, the BA applies only to securities transactions made on or
after January 1, 1983, the date the BA entered into force.
2 37
Customers' waivers are problematic in another sense. If the cus-
tomer expressly consents to the BA by signing a waiver of the right to
confidentiality before actually trading on a United States securities mar-
ket, and before there is a suspicion of any wrongdoing, the prospective
waiver of a fundamental personality right may be challenged as being
against public policy. Such a waiver of confidentiality may be contrary
to the Swiss public order and to Article 27(2) of the Swiss Civil Code
"which provides that no person can alienate his personal liberty nor im-
pose any restrictions on his enjoyment thereof, which are contrary to law
or morality. 2 3' Because of the general nature of the customer's waiver,
such an argument could possibly succeed.2 39 Furthermore, the customer
waiver creates additional complications with regard to Article 273 of the
Swiss Penal Code which seeks to protect the public interest and which
individuals are not authorized to waive.240 If the customer's consent to
the BA were presumed following the customer's failure to respond to two
bank solicitations seeking consent, a Swiss court could decide that con-
sent was never given, since, under Swiss law, silence to an offer usually
does not constitute acceptance.241
In principle, signing the BA would appear to be in a Swiss bank's
best interest. Signature eliminates the dilemma banks traditionally face
in deciding which of the conflicting United States and Swiss disclosure
laws to follow in insider trading proceedings. Adherence to the BA al-
lows a bank to avoid United States court-imposed asset attachments,
fines, and prohibitions of trading on securities markets. Adherence also
shields a bank from Swiss civil and criminal prosecutions for violating
secrecy laws. Finally, to the extent that all other Swiss banks sign the
BA, no one bank will acquire a competitive advantage over another.2 42
To date, all of the members of the Swiss Bankers' Association who trade
on United States securities markets have signed the BA, thus reducing
the possibility that a major Swiss bank will harbor illegal insider trading
profits.2 43
In practice, signing the BA might be less attractive than it otherwise
237 Id.
238 See Honegger, supra note 33, at 33.
239 Id.
240 See Greene, supra note 18, at 27.
241 Id. at 34.
242 See Navickas, supra note 3, at 183.
243 All banking and brokerage firms of consequence are members of the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion. Id.
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appears. Despite the fact that all Swiss Bankers' Association banks that
trade on United States securities markets are signatories to the Agree-
ment, there remain in Switzerland brokers who trade on United States
securities markets who are not subject to the Swiss Bankers's Agree-
ment. 2" Although the volume of their United States trading activity
may presently be low, if insiders can neutralize the effects of the MOU by
choosing brokers who do not require customers to waive rights to confi-
dentiality, trading through those brokers on United States stock ex-
changes may grow substantially. 45 Worse yet, if, as a result of the MOU
and BA, insider transactions through Swiss banks are made more diffi-
cult, determined inside traders may not halt their illegal activities. They
may simply move them out of Switzerland to places such as Liechten-
stein, Panama, or the Caribbean.2 4 6
IX. CONCLUSION
The MOU and BA arguably contribute much to improving United
States efforts to detect insider trading. Exactly how much they have al-
ready contributed is difficult to measure. As the authorities involved
agreed to keep all proceedings under the Memorandum secret, one can-
not obtain empirical data on the Memorandum's usage.24 Michael
Mann of the SEC's Enforcement Division admits that the SEC has been
both granted and denied assistance under the MOU since its signature in
1982. He cannot reveal the reasons why assistance was withheld or when
it was requested. He has, however, insinuated that both "public order"
assertions and Commission of Inquiry findings, that certain traders were
not insiders, led to the denials. 48
Pending before the Swiss Parliament is legislation which would
criminalize insider trading in Switzerland.24 9 This legislation represents
the optimal solution for reconciling the differences between United States
and Swiss attitudes towards security and bank secrecy protections. If
insider trading, per se, becomes a crime under Swiss law, the dual crimi-
nality requirement of MAT will be met more easily than under the pres-
ent regime. Mandatory assistance under the Treaty will then become
244 See Honegger, supra note 33 at 37.
245 Id. at 33.
246 Id. at 36.
247 Telephone Conversation with Michael Mann, Chief of the Office of International Legal Assist-
ance, SEC Enforcement Division (Dec. 6, 1985).
248 .1d.
249 DRAFT OF PROPOSED Swiss LEGISLATION ON INSIDER TRADING, Department Federale de
Justice et Police, Doe. No. V776/LK/HS/PS/SM, annexe, reprinted in Navickas, supra note 3, at
190-91.
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available in a wide range of insider trading cases. The new law is ex-
pected to encompass insider trading in more than just a mergers and
acquisitions setting. ° It is estimated that, following review by the Swiss
Parliament's first chamber in 1985 and the second chamber in 1986, the
proposal will become law in early 1987.251
Ellen R. Levin
250 Conversation with Michael Mann, supra note 247.
251 Id.
